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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law has a problem.  Copyright protections must tow a fine line 
by providing incentives for authors to create new works of art, literature, 
music, and other protectable forms of expression without constricting the 
public’s access to those new works.1  Partly in response to this dualistic 
purpose, courts created the fair use defense to copyright infringement 
actions,2 and Congress eventually codified it within the Copyright Act.3 
Fair use has grown to become a valuable defense, but it is currently 
unpredictable in terms of its application.4  In particular, judges have failed 
to reach a consensus as to what constitutes transformativeness—a key and 
potentially decisive element under fair use analysis.5  Essentially, courts 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)); see also Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (discussing how copyright 
protection’s grant of a limited monopoly serves to eventually allow the public full access to 
products of genius); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(emphasizing how the copyright’s limited monopoly must ultimately promote the 
availability of protectable works to the public). 
 2. In 1841, Justice Story set forth the fair use defense as a means of determining 
whether there could ever be a justifiable use of copyrighted materials.  See Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (stating that judges should “look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and 
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the 
objects, of the original work”); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 
510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (discussing Justice Story’s expression of fair use factors in 
Folsom as the foundation for the continued judicial interpretation of the fair use defense 
until its eventual codification by Congress in 1976). 
 3. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  Congress recognized that courts had adopted the fair 
use defense as a means of allowing people in certain situations, such as in news reporting or 
within educational settings, to use copyrighted materials without permission.  See id. pmbl. 
(listing news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research, amongst others, as instances 
where unauthorized use of copyrighted materials may be found fair use, and therefore, not 
an infringement); see also Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 
65-70 (1976) (discussing the emergence of the fair use defense as a prevalent defense in 
copyright infringement actions, its increasing adoption by the courts as a legitimate defense, 
and describing some examples of potential fair use, such as use of excerpts in commentary 
and scholarship). 
 4. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (stating, “since the doctrine is an equitable rule of 
reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts”); see also Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 577 (suggesting the 
inappropriateness of bright line rules in evaluating fair use defenses, and affirming the need 
for case by case analysis); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 
1939) (referring to fair use as “the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright”); Pierre 
N. Leval, J., Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1990) 
(arguing that the frequency of reversals and divided courts in fair use cases demonstrates the 
lack of consistent principles regarding fair use analysis, a problem which makes it difficult 
to predict the outcome of new fair use cases). 
 5. For example, courts have now generally accepted the notion that parodies can 
qualify as transformative, but that satires, though they may seem transformative, will most 
likely not pass a fair use analysis.  See infra Part I.B (comparing how courts have generally 
been accepting of parodies as transformative works, due in large part to the artists’ need to 
use the copyrighted material in order to mock that material itself, while courts have been far 
less favorable to satires, which some courts argue are non-transformative because artists do 
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will be more likely to find fair use if the new user has transformed, or 
clearly added something new to the copyrighted material that the artist has 
taken without permission.6 
The crux of the issue is this—when does a new work transform an old 
one, and when does it merely steal the work of another?  Critics and 
commentators in the music field have raised these questions with 
increasing frequency when it comes to the practice of digital sampling7 in 
music.8  Musicians have turned digital sampling into a staple of the music 
production industry, especially within the hip-hop genre.9  For the most 
part, courts have not been kind to musicians who have sampled copyright 
holders’ works without authorization.  Some courts have even found unfair 
infringement based on taking just a few notes.10 
                                                          
not need to use the copyrighted material to convey their message). 
 6. For Leval, the issue comes down to whether the new user has added new value to 
the original work.  See Leval, supra note 4, at 1111 (arguing that the use of copyrighted 
material as raw material should be allowed when it creates “new information, new 
aesthetics, new insights and understandings,” and that such use is, in fact, “the very type of 
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society”). 
 7. Sampling involves the digital reproduction and play back of previously recorded 
materials.  See Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche:  Digital Sampling, Intermediate 
Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 271, 275 (1996) (providing in-depth background 
on the history of sampling); id. at 275-78 (discussing how modern sampling technology 
allows artists—DJs, sound engineers, programmers, etc.—to record music, digitally 
manipulate it, change characteristics of the music such as the pitch or tempo, loop it, and 
drop it into a new work). 
 8. See generally A. Dean Johnson, Comment, Music Copyrights:  The Need for an 
Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in Digital Sampling Suits, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 147-
49 (1993) (arguing that musicians who use unauthorized samples should be able to assert a 
fair use defense, yet suggesting that the simple addition of lyrics to a digital sampling of 
copyrighted music would be unlikely to amount to transformativeness); Szymanski, supra 
note 7, at 313-15 (evaluating whether sampling amounts to transformative use, and 
suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Acuff-Rose indicates that the Supreme 
Court would be unlikely to find the re-contextualization of a sample as sufficiently 
transformative). 
 9. See David Sanjek, “Don’t Have to DJ No More”:  Sampling and the 
“Autonomous” Creator, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607, 610 (1992) (stating that most 
people commonly associate sampling with hip-hop, but that musicians in all genres have 
begun to use sampling); Szymanski, supra note 7, at 277-78 (discussing the history of 
sampling, and arguing that sampling is pervasive throughout the music industry). 
 10. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398-99 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that holders of copyrighted sound recordings have the exclusive right to 
sample their own works, and refusing to allow infringers to assert that their samples amount 
to de minimis uses); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a 
sample of even a small portion of a work may be infringing if it is “qualitatively 
important”).  But see Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
defendant’s sample consisting of three notes was de minimis, and therefore non-infringing). 
Overall, the issue of de minimis uses of sampled music remains unsettled.  While Newton 
allowed such a use, that case involved specific facts, including that the defendants had 
obtained a license for the sound recording at issue, just not for the underlying composition.  
Id. at 593.  Meanwhile, Bridgeport’s categorical denial of de minimis uses has been strongly 
criticized.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of 
Law and Electronic Frontier Foundation 3-18, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 
401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-5738) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit, upon rehearing 
of the Bridgeport case, should acknowledge the long history of courts permitting de minimis 
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Most musicians have learned by now that they must license samples 
from copyright owners prior to using them; however, sometimes this is not 
so easily accomplished.  Some copyright owners will demand exorbitant 
fees, and others will simply refuse to allow their music to be sampled by 
another artist.11  Many new artists feel that these high fees and refusals 
stifle creativity and allow the big music labels (who own most of the 
copyrights) to limit the development of music by new, unsigned artists who 
do not have the resources to license from numerous rights’ holders.12 
To many artists, sampling represents a way to express new ideas by 
using older material as a foundation for a new work that expresses 
something wholly different from the original material.13  Based on this type 
of re-contextualization, some commentators have placed the practice of 
sampling squarely within the realm of the postmodern art form.14  Sampling 
allows an artist to create juxtapositions between seemingly different 
materials in shocking and profound ways.15 
                                                          
amounts of copying, and requesting that the Court reverse its decision to forbid de minimis 
uses of material from sound recordings); Marjorie Heins, Free Expression Policy Project, 
Commentary, Trashing the Copyright Balance, Sept. 21, 2004, http://www.fepproject.or 
g/commentaries/bridgeport.html (criticizing the Bridgeport decision because the court failed 
to consider either of the two copyright mechanisms which allow for some creative use of 
copyrighted work since it declined to apply the de minimis rule, and completely ignored the 
possibility of a fair use defense); Gary Young, 6th Circuit Clamps Down on ‘Sampling’, 
NAT’L L. J., Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/articl 
e.jsp?id=1096473910640 (noting that even the Recording Industry Association of America 
filed an amicus brief calling on the Sixth Circuit to reconsider Bridgeport out of its belief 
that the decision would disrupt over a decade of music industry acceptance of the de 
minimis standard). 
 11. See generally Katie Dean, Grey Album Fans Protest Clampdown, WIRED NEWS, 
Feb. 24, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62372,00.html (relating the 
concerns of artists who feel that sampling fees are prohibitively expensive); Noah 
Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 14, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62276,00.html (discussing the absence of set 
licensing fees, the prohibition against beat-matching, and noting that The Beatles’ music in 
particular is off limits to samplers). 
 12. See Elizabeth Armstrong, Suppressed Album Finds Voice on Web, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2004, at 11 (offering the view of Glenn Otis Brown, executive director of 
Creative Commons, that labels who charge high fees restrict growth and experimentation by 
new artists); Dean, supra note 11 (presenting the view of DJ Variable, a DJ and music 
producer, who believes that artists signed by major music labels are the only ones who can 
afford to sample, because the labels will put up the money for the high fees). 
 13. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 278-79 (comparing the use of samples by artists 
who want the listener to think about the sample within its new context with musicians who 
pack their works with many samples to convey a larger theme); see also Sanjek, supra note 
9, at 612-15 (discussing the possible uses of sampling, including “quilt-pop” where multiple 
samples can be used to “create a new aesthetic”). 
 14. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 281-89 (presenting the view that music which 
features samples amounts to a form of postmodern art, based on its similarity to some 
aspects of collage, and its inclusion of divergent forms and genres of music within the same 
work). 
 15. See id. at 283 (relaying how the sampler may use wildly different types of music to 
“weave together otherwise irreconcilable references,” resulting in a product that “often 
bewilders traditional musical meaning”). 
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This Comment explores whether the fair use defense to copyright 
infringement has the flexibility to adapt to new re-combinative or re-
contextualized forms of music and art, particularly in the context of 
sampling.16  Based on the increasing prevalence of re-contextualized forms 
of art, and the public’s desire for them, this Comment argues that the fair 
use defense can and should accommodate these emerging art forms. 
This Comment begins in Part I with a brief definition and history of the 
fair use defense.  Part II demonstrates how the failure to adapt the fair use 
defense to re-contextualized works of art may undermine the viability of 
the postmodern artistic movement.17  Part II then briefly examines the 
postmodern movement by focusing on the rise of digital sampling in music, 
and more specifically, on a new form of music known as “Bastard Pop” or 
“Mash-ups.”18  Part III examines one such work, DJ Danger Mouse’s The 
Grey Album, to explore whether the fair use defense could save such an 
artist from a copyright infringement action, based on the theory that his 
work is transformative.19  It uses the four factor fair use analysis to 
                                                          
 16. Much has been written about sampling and its relation to fair use, however, this 
Comment focuses more on whether an artist may seek shelter under the fair use defense 
when he or she takes quantitatively large pieces of different copyrighted material and fuses 
them together to create a truly transformative and therefore qualitatively new work.  
Therefore, this Comment focuses on potential judicial solutions to problems of an artist’s 
use of copyrighted material.  At least one commentator has put forth an interesting and 
compelling argument calling for a legislative solution to the problem of digital sampling.  
See generally Kenneth M. Achenbach, Grey Area:  How Recent Developments in Digital 
Music Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory Licensing for 
Sample-Based Works, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 187 (2004) (citing the situation surrounding 
Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album as an example of the tension between ambitious but 
unfunded music producers and the copyright holders who decline to license their music for 
sampling, and arguing for amendment to the Copyright Act that would require compulsory 
licensing for digital music sampling). 
 17. Postmodern artists who create re-contextualized works of art often rely on older 
works as the source material for works that demonstrate new perspectives on existing ideas.  
See, e.g., Szymanski, supra note 7, at 319 n.216 (stating that through reconceptualization the 
newer work will often appeal to an entirely different market than the previous work).  This 
type of use necessarily conflicts with current copyright interpretations which bar the 
unauthorized use of copyrighted material.  17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).  The fair use defense 
therefore becomes these artists’ best hope to fight for legal allowance of what they feel to be 
a valid, and increasingly acknowledged, form of art.  Infra Part II. 
 18. Bastard Pop (also known as mash-ups) reflects music where new artists take the 
background music of one song, and lay the lyrics of a very different type of song over that 
music to create a surprising new work.  See WordIQ.com, Definition of Bastard Pop, 
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Bastard_Pop (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (providing a host 
of information about the term “bastard pop,” including synonyms, history, subgenres, and 
external links). 
 19. In The Grey Album, Danger Mouse combined the lyrics of the rapper Jay-Z’s The 
Black Album with music taken exclusively from The Beatles’ The White Album to create his 
new work, without first receiving permission from either the owners of the rights to Jay-Z’s 
songs or The Beatles’ songs.  See generally Elec. Frontier Found., Grey Tuesday:  A Quick 
Overview of the Legal Terrain, http://www.eff.org/IP/grey_tuesday.php (last visited Sept. 5, 
2005) (providing the background to the Grey Album dispute and the subsequent decision of 
hundreds of on-line activists to post The Grey Album on their websites in protest of EMI’s 
actions, along with some legal analysis as to the rights of those websites to post the album); 
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elucidate the current uncertainty of the fair use defense in general, and the 
issue of transformativeness in particular.  After analyzing The Grey Album, 
this Comment concludes that, in light of the relation between the goals of 
copyright and the increasing influence of postmodern expression, fair use 
can and should adapt to new re-contextualized works of art. 
I. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE & THE ISSUE OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
A. The Fair Use Defense 
Copyright protection involves the power of Congress to grant a limited 
monopoly of certain rights, such as reproduction and distribution, to artists 
as an incentive for them to create new works, which will ultimately be 
vested in the public domain.20  Congress’s power to grant such rights stems 
directly from the Constitution.21  Pursuant to this right, artists may obtain 
copyrights as soon as they create an original work in a tangible medium of 
expression.22 
Since the creation of the copyright, courts have questioned whether or 
not particular instances of infringement should be allowed.  In the 1841 
case Folsom v. Marsh,23 Justice Story began to craft the fair use doctrine by 
outlining some of the key factors to consider in such a situation.24  He 
                                                          
Shachtman, supra note 11 (presenting the background to The Grey Album dispute). 
A recent article discussing the lack of clarity surrounding copyright laws and how they 
relate to the practice of sampling also seizes upon Danger Mouse’s work as a focal point.  
See Bryan Bergman, Into the Grey: The Unclear Laws of Digital Sampling, 27 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 619 (2005).  The author focuses largely on the need for legislative 
changes, such as a compulsory licensing scheme for sampling, yet seems skeptical about the 
possibility of expanding the fair use doctrine to cover works like The Grey Album.  See id. 
at 642.   
In contrast, this Comment focuses more broadly on whether re-contextualized works 
featuring large amounts of copyrighted material (be it a music sample or some other form of 
artistic expression) should fall under the fair use doctrine via the transformative doctrine.  
This Comment, therefore, examines Danger Mouse’s work under the fair use analysis in 
order to demonstrate the potential success, not failure, of a fair use claim. 
 20. The copyright confers five exclusive rights to the copyright holder:  the right to 
reproduce the work; the right to prepare a derivative work; the right to distribute the original 
work; the right to perform the work; and the right to publicly display the work.  17 U.S.C. § 
106 (2000).  Currently, works created after January 1, 1978 enjoy these rights for a period 
lasting the lifetime of the author, plus seventy years.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
 21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . . to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (stating that a tangible medium of expression can be 
any medium “now known or later developed, from which [the work] can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device”). 
 23. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 24. Justice Story had to determine whether or not an alleged infringer should have been 
able to use portions of George Washington’s letters, which had previously been published in 
another volume by the plaintiff.  Id. at 345.  Justice Story considered whether this use could 
be considered an abridgement, and if so, whether it should be allowed despite the use of 
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indicated that there might be fair uses of copyrighted materials, and that 
when evaluating such a defense, judges should “look to the nature and 
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, 
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the 
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”25 
The fair use doctrine helps to ensure that a copyright does not unfairly 
restrict the public’s access to protected works.26  Partly for this reason, 
Congress eventually codified the fair use defense, along with the essence of 
Justice Story’s proposed factors, within the Copyright Act of 1976 
(“Copyright Act”).27  The preamble to the fair use defense section of the 
Copyright Act describes a few of the areas where Congress felt the fair use 
defense might apply:  “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright.”28  The fair use section goes on to list four key factors for the 
court to consider when an alleged infringer asserts a fair use defense:  (1) 
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature 
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.29  
This list of factors is non-exclusive;30 however, they are the only factors 
                                                          
copyrighted materials.  Id. at 348.  In this case, Justice Story ultimately felt that that the 
defendant had taken too much.  See id. at 349 (establishing the foundations of the fair use 
defense, but finding defendant’s use to be unfair based on the fact that he appropriated three 
hundred and nineteen of plaintiff’s letters, and that the letters comprised a full one-third of 
defendant’s work). 
 25. Id. at 348. 
 26. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1107-08 (arguing that copyright should increase and not 
impede knowledge available to the public, and also noting that the stipulation in the 
Constitution that the right be granted “for limited [t]imes” indicates that it was not meant to 
be an absolute or moral right); see also Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 
303, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasizing that the fair use defense serves the public interest 
by ensuring the distribution of important works like biographies, historical works, or works 
that advance science or the arts).  But see John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of 
Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 481-86 (2005) (criticizing Justice 
Story’s formulation of the fair use test in Folsom as a drastic move from the utilitarian view 
of copyright—which considered transformative works to be entirely non-infringing—to a 
stricter, natural rights vision of copyright, which finds infringement based on substantial 
similarity and shifts the burden to the secondary user to prove fair use, even if the new work 
transforms the old one). 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)(presenting the four-factor fair use analysis).  Although 
the statutory language appears quite similar to Justice Story’s presentation of key factors, 
some changes were made.  For instance, Congress specifically noted within the first factor 
(the purpose and character of the use) that courts should consider whether the alleged 
infringer’s work “is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.”  Id. 
 28. Id. § 107 pmbl. 
 29. Id. § 107. 
 30. See id. (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
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listed in the statute itself.31 
B. The Issue of Transformativeness 
Judge Pierre Leval32 has argued that the issue of transformativeness is 
one of the most important, if not the most important, considerations in a 
fair use analysis.33  According to Leval, for the work to be considered 
transformative enough to essentially create a new work, “the use must be 
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for 
a different purpose from the original.”34  In terms of the types of uses that 
could be considered transformative, Leval suggests that excerpts used for 
criticism, parody, symbolism, and aesthetic declarations, amongst others, 
may qualify.35 
During their evaluation of a fair use claim, courts often will consider 
whether the alleged infringer has sufficiently transformed the original 
                                                          
fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . .”  (emphasis added)). 
 31. Commentators have debated whether there are any non-statutorily defined factors 
that courts either regularly consider or should consider.  Some commentators find these 
supposed other factors to be “false factors.”  See, e.g., Leval, supra note 4, at 1125-30 
(arguing that a consideration of factors such as good faith, artistic integrity, and privacy 
rights unnecessarily diverts attention from the court’s proper consideration of the statutory 
factors). 
In the context of digital music sampling cases, which will be further discussed in Part II, 
some commentators have argued that the courts should consider some specialized factors 
not mentioned in the Copyright Act.  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 156-61 (proposing 
that within digital sampling cases, courts consider such additional factors as “the importance 
of the sampled material both to the original recording and the allegedly infringing work,” 
“the frequency with which the sample is used in the allegedly infringing work,” and the 
“alteration of the sampled material,” amongst others). 
 32. Judge Leval is a United States Appellate Court Judge for the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals. 
 33. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1110-13 (positing that the first factor of the fair use 
defense (purpose and character of the use) seeks to consider the justification of the work by 
questioning whether it “fulfill[s] the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for 
public illumination,” and suggesting that “the answer . . . turns primarily on whether, and to 
what extent, the challenged use is transformative.”). 
Various courts, including the Supreme Court, have cited, approved, or adopted Leval’s 
characterizations of “transformativeness” and its importance.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing Leval, supra note 4, at 
1111) (claiming the central purpose of the first factor is to determine whether the new work 
“adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent 
the new work is ‘transformative’”); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 
112 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting and approving of the Supreme Court’s adoption of “Judge 
Leval’s helpful adjective ‘transformative’” in Acuff-Rose). 
 34. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1111 (arguing that the fair use doctrine is intended to 
promote the type of secondary use which “adds value to the original,” and which leads to 
“the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” because 
the promotion of such uses will ensure the enrichment of society based on its free access to 
new works). 
 35. See id. (including as well works “criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character 
of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the original work in 
order to defend or rebut it”). 
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copyrighted material by adding some new value, or whether the infringer 
has simply copied the copyrighted material.36  Despite the perceived 
importance of transformativeness and judicial attention to the aspect of fair 
use, courts have offered few concrete principles to help predict whether 
future courts will find a use to be sufficiently transformative.  However, 
several guidelines have emerged. 
1. Parodies as transformative works 
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,37 the Supreme Court held that 
artists who create parodies may be allowed to use portions of copyrighted 
material in order to provide their audience with enough similarity to the 
original as to make the parody readily apparent.38  The Court reasoned that 
parodies represent a desired form of social commentary,39 and noted that 
few artists or copyright holders would license portions of their work to 
those who ridicule them.40  In terms of transformativeness, the parodist 
takes an element of the original material and uses it in such a way that 
changes the original expression.41  When considering how much of the 
                                                          
 36. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that “the goal of copyright, to promote 
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works,” and that 
“the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, 
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use”).  Some courts and 
commentators will be far more likely to approve of a use as fair if the end result is 
something new, based on the theory that the public should benefit from new works.  See id. 
at 569 (finding that the defendants’ use of copyrighted material within a parody would most 
likely constitute a fair use based on the transformative nature of the work).  If, however, the 
alleged infringer has merely copied the materials and added nothing of value, then the 
public clearly has not benefited from any new work, and the holder of the copyright has, in 
fact, been deprived of the copyright reward.  See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol 
Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying a finding of fair use to an 
infringer who took pieces of dialogue from a hit television show and inserted them into a 
trivia book because the few questions framed around the excerpts added no real value and 
failed to transform the original material); Leval, supra note 4, at 1116 (arguing that if 
secondary use of copyrighted material fails to be transformative, then the fair use defense 
should be rejected). 
 37. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 38. Id. at 588.  In Acuff-Rose, the rap group 2 Live Crew had sampled portions of Roy 
Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” for their song “Pretty Woman.”  Id. at 572-73.  The Court 
found that 2 Live Crew’s song amounted to a parody on the naiveté of the Orbison song, and 
that the infringing use was a fair use.  See id. (remanding the case to a lower court to 
determine only whether 2 Live Crew had substantially affected Orbison’s market for 
derivative rights). 
 39. See id. at 579 (noting that “[l]ike less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, 
[parody] can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the 
process, creating a new one”). 
 40. See id. at 592 (suggesting that there is no derivative market for parodies, since 
authors are highly unlikely to license critical reviews or parodies). 
 41. See id. at 579 (proclaiming that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative 
value” due to its ability to simultaneously criticize an old work while creating a new one).  
In this case, 2 Live Crew’s use of the Orbison bass riff and opening line create a familiar 
reaction in the audience, one which is quickly changed once the song turns into a rap that 
describes a whole different world than Orbison’s.  See id. at 588-89 (discussing how 2 Live 
Crew used enough of the Orbison material to conjure up the tune for the audience, but then 
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copyrighted material an artist may use, the Court noted that the parodist 
must be able to use enough for the audience to recognize the reference, but 
cannot take so much that it will become a market substitute for the 
original.42  The Court, in considering the effect that the parody would have 
on the market for the original artist’s work, stated that when “the second 
use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market 
harm may not be so readily inferred.”43 
Essentially, the Court suggested in Acuff-Rose that a use is 
transformative if (1) the artist has infused the old material with new 
expression or meaning (i.e., parody uses the copyrighted material to 
criticize that material, but also creates a new work), and (2) that the use 
alters the original in such a way that the market for the original will not be 
affected (noting, of course, that the greater the amount of the original used, 
the more likely it will supersede the original, and thus affect the original’s 
market).44  In terms of the fair use analysis, if the court finds the work to be 
transformative within the first factor, and that such transformation makes 
market harm unlikely under the fourth factor, then the commercial or non-
commercial aspect of the alleged infringing work will become far less 
important.45  Acuff-Rose illustrates that parodies constitute valid 
transformative works by meeting these very criteria. 
2. Satire and transformativeness 
Though courts seem to have adopted the idea that an artist may fairly use 
copyrighted materials to parody the original, courts have thus far been less 
forgiving when it comes to satire.  In Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin 
                                                          
added new lyrics and new sounds, thus keeping the use of the copyrighted material to the 
minimum amount necessary to achieve the parody). 
 42. See id. at 588 (noting that when considering the reasonableness of a parodist’s use 
of copyrighted material beyond that which is necessary to conjure up the original work, 
courts must remain aware of the possibility that allowing too much to be taken will increase 
the likelihood of the new work serving as a market substitute for the old one). 
 43. Id. at 591.  The Court went so far as to claim that “as to parody pure and simple, it 
is more likely that the new work will not affect the market for the original in a way 
cognizable under this factor.”  Id. 
 44. While Acuff-Rose dealt primarily with parodies, the Court’s fair use analysis and its 
consideration of the issue of transformativeness is relevant beyond the context of parodies.  
See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (claiming that 
Acuff-Rose “clarified the fair use defense in general”). 
Outside the realm of parodies, for instance, courts have similarly concluded that a work 
should be considered transformative if new material has been added to create new meaning, 
and that such addition is sufficient to make market harm unlikely.  See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. 
Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[b]ook reviews and 
parodies are merely examples of types of work that quote or otherwise copy from 
copyrighted works yet constitute fair use because they are complements of . . . rather than 
substitutes for the copyrighted original”). 
 45. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (finding that the more transformative a work is, 
“the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”). 
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Books U.S.A., Inc.,46 the Ninth Circuit declined to find that an infringer’s 
use of the characteristic style of Dr. Seuss was fair use when it appeared in 
a satire.47  The court noted that the new work was not transformative, since 
it merely copied the style of Dr. Seuss and re-told the O.J. Simpson tale.48  
The work did not use Dr. Seuss’ style to make fun of Dr. Seuss; it merely 
used it as a means of getting attention.49  Unlike the parody in Acuff-Rose, 
the court felt that the new authors had demonstrated “no effort to create a 
transformative work with ‘new expression, meaning, or message.’”50  The 
court agreed with Acuff-Rose’s parody-satire distinction, noting that 
parodies need to use the copyrighted material to quickly conjure up a 
reference to the audience, while satires do not.  Satires merely use the 
substance or style of a recognizable work as a means for making fun of 
something else, and thus should not be allowed to seek shelter under the 
fair use defense.51 
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, although the infringer altered the material in 
such a way that there may not have been a market impact,52 his use of the 
material was not valid since it failed to be transformative.53  As in Acuff-
Rose, the court’s conclusion on the issue of transformativeness essentially 
affected the first and fourth factors of the fair use test.  However, because 
the Dr. Seuss satire failed to be transformative, the commercial aspect of 
that work weighed more heavily against the infringers, thus tipping the first 
factor against them and making the presence or absence of market harm 
less dispositive.54 
                                                          
 46. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 47. Id. at 1401.  The defendant wrote a book entitled The Cat Not in the Hat, in which 
he mimicked the style of verse and illustration of Dr. Seuss to provide a humorous take on 
the O.J. Simpson murder trial.  Id. at 1396-97. 
 48. Id. at 1401. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 
579 (1994)) (describing as well how the absence of “new expression, meaning or message” 
allows the commercial purpose of the enterprise to weigh more heavily against a finding of 
fair use). 
 51. Id. at 1400 (citing Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580).  But see Tehranian, supra note 26, 
at 497-501 (suggesting that from a utilitarian perspective, there is no real reason to 
differentiate satire and parody, since they both may lead to transformative new works, and 
concluding that the Court’s parody-satire distinction “reduces fair use to a test about 
necessity,” which further reflects the continuing move from a copyright based on utilitarian 
goals to a natural law-based copyright). 
 52. See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1403 (noting that although the defendants 
claimed there was no market harm, they failed to provide any evidence substantiating that 
claim, thereby cementing the fourth factor against a finding of fair use). 
 53. See Tehranian, supra note 26, at 500 (contending that the court “virtually equated 
transformative use with parody,” leading it to find the satire based on Dr. Seuss’s work to be 
an invalid use). 
 54. In contrast to a parody, the court found the satirical purpose to be insufficiently 
transformative under the first factor of the analysis.  See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 
1400-01 (arguing that while the presence of a valid transformative purpose, such as parody, 
will mitigate the negative impact of a commercial purpose, in the context of a fair use 
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3. Transformativeness in other contexts 
Aside from the parody-satire distinction, courts have offered few other 
indications as to when something will be transformative enough to justify a 
finding of fair use.  Other cases surrounding the issue of transformativeness 
have focused mainly on how much new material or new value has been 
added to the taken material.  In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol 
Publishing Group,55 for instance, the Second Circuit rejected a fair use 
defense where the secondary user compiled a large amount of quotations 
and other materials from the TV show Seinfeld, and used that compilation 
in a trivia book entitled The Seinfeld Aptitude Test.56  The court found the 
defendant’s claim of transformativeness unconvincing, noting the minimal 
addition of any new expression in the book, as well as the failure of the 
new work to criticize or comment in any meaningful way on the show.57  
Here, the court’s focus fell on both the minimal alteration, which reflected 
an invalid purpose (neither commentary nor parody) under the first factor 
of the fair use analysis, and on the lack of transformativeness which 
demonstrated a negative effect on the original’s potential derivative market 
under the fourth factor.58 
Courts, as evidenced by these cases, consider transformativeness 
throughout their four factor fair use defense analysis, rather than 
considering it as a separate factor in itself.  Even if a new work exhibits a 
change in tone or setting, courts will still be hesitant to find it a fair use if 
they disapprove of the purpose and character of the use.59  Furthermore, it 
                                                          
defense, the absence of transformative purpose, combined with a clear commercial purpose, 
will weigh heavily against the infringer under the first factor).  This combination also makes 
it far more likely that a court will find a significant market detriment under the fourth factor.  
Id. 
 55. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 56. Id. at 142-43. 
 57. See id. (concluding that “[a]ny transformative purpose possessed by The [Seinfeld 
Aptitude Test] is slight to non-existent” based largely on the book’s failure to offer any real 
commentary or criticism of Seinfeld).  The court also noted that while the new authors did in 
a literal sense transform the materials from one medium to another, they showed little to no 
transformative purpose in doing so, and that a transformative purpose is what will allow a 
finding of fair use.  See id. (rejecting the argument that the defendants created the book to 
educate Seinfeld fans, citing statements by the defendants and the book itself that it is 
merely meant to entertain fans).  Furthermore, the Court found that the new work harmed 
the original author’s right to produce derivative products, noting that the lack of additional 
expression and the lack of commentary separated this case from ones involving parody and 
other transformative uses, where the derivative market is less likely to suffer such injury.  
Id. at 145. 
 58. See id. at 145-46 (finding that the new work harmed the original author’s right to 
produce derivative products, and noting that the lack of additional expression and the lack of 
commentary separated this case from ones involving parody and other transformative uses, 
where the derivative market is less likely to suffer such injury). 
 59. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994) (finding parody to be a valid transformative use because of its goal of social 
commentary combined with its inherent need to use copyrighted material to make fun of that 
copyrighted material), with Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1401 (declining to find satire to 
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is clear that courts will still evaluate how much was taken and whether 
there was an impact on the market for the original work.60  However, if a 
new work adds enough new expression or new meaning for courts to 
determine that it amounts to a proper transformative purpose, it will then be 
more likely that courts will permit a greater use of copyrighted material 
(i.e., in the case of parody), and will be less likely to find a negative market 
impact.61   
Beyond the four factors, courts consistently examine two additional 
factors when looking at the transformativeness of a new work.  The Castle 
Rock case illustrates how courts consider the amount and substantiality of 
the material that has been added to the old work.62  Courts also examine 
whether the added material has led to a significant change in the tone or 
expression of the piece.63  These last two factors are particularly important 
when considering whether artists who take large portions of divergent 
copyrighted materials and re-contextualize those materials within a new 
work have sufficiently transformed the copyrighted work enough to 
succeed in a fair use defense.  All of these factors work together:  if there is 
a large amount of new material added, that might increase the chances of a 
change in tone, which would, in turn, provide evidence of a valid 
transformative purpose, while also making it more likely that the use will 
not have a negative market impact. 
                                                          
be fair use because it does not need to use copyrighted material to make fun of that material; 
rather, it unfairly uses copyrighted material as a means of attracting attention). 
 60. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 588 (noting that courts must remain aware of the 
possibility that allowing too much copyrighted material to be taken will increase the 
likelihood of the new work serving as a market substitute for the old one, regardless of the 
artistic intent). 
 61. See id. at 579 (discussing how a parody’s commentary on existing material 
essentially creates a new work, thus making it a valid transformative use); see also Comedy 
III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (emphasizing that within a 
right of publicity case, courts should consider whether the defendant’s work was 
transformative by questioning whether the result is “so transformed that it has become 
primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness”). 
Judge Posner evaluates fair use claims in a similar fashion, although he refers to a 
complement-substitute distinction, where new works that add new material such that they 
complement the original are more likely to be fair use than ones that serve as substitutions 
for the original.  See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(arguing that a Beanie Babies collector’s guide has a greater fair use claim than a simple 
picture book with photos of Beanie Babies, since the former has useful material that helps 
the book serve as a complement to the original Beanie Babies, while the latter merely 
reproduces pictures, which violated Ty, Inc.’s right to produce derivative products). 
 62. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc., 150 F.3d at 145-46 (arguing that the lack of added 
expression or new material prevented a finding of a valid transformative purpose); cf. 
Comedy III Prods., Inc., 29 P.3d at 811 (concluding that defendant’s depiction of the Three 
Stooges was a literal depiction, thus evidencing a failure of transformativeness because 
nothing of note had been added to change their likenesses). 
 63. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 589 (emphasizing how in addition to using a small 
amount of copyrighted work to conjure up the Orbison original, 2 Live Crew went on to 
significantly depart from the original’s lyrics and added new sounds, resulting in new 
expression). 
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II. NEW FORMS OF RE-CONTEXTUALIZED ART 
Since the goal of copyright is public enrichment, based on providing 
incentives for artists to create new works,64 copyright should be able to 
adapt to new artistic styles and movements.65  New artistic expression 
reflective of the postmodern movement, however, challenges the flexibility 
of copyright.66 
Postmodernism has emerged as a cultural viewpoint that rebels against 
the ordered, coherent, black or white view of the modern movement.67  
Postmodern expressive works defy conventional structure, praise irony, and 
often exhibit the incorporation of a variety of different styles as a means of 
demonstrating an “accepting of the fragmentation of contemporary 
existence.”68  Many postmodern works rely on pastiche, or the imitation of 
existing styles, in part to express the postmodern notion that it is no longer 
possible to create new styles.69  Postmodern artists, in short, create re-
contextualized works that piece together materials of previously existing, 
but divergent styles to create new, often ironic expressions reflecting the 
disjointed nature of life in today’s society.70 
                                                          
 64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (citing the U.S. Constitution for this 
principle). 
 65. As an example, when initially invented and for awhile after, photographs were not 
thought to be protected by copyright, since critics maintained that they were merely the 
product of a mechanical reproduction, not any creation by an author.  See generally 
Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of 
Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385 (2004) (discussing the history behind the Supreme 
Court decision on whether or not to extend copyright protection to photographs). 
 66. See Tehranian, supra note 26, at 493 (“With the rise of digital technology and the 
potential for new forms of appropriation (and new forms of art based upon the act of 
appropriation), the dangers of the modern infringement test are even more significant.  
Digital technology has enabled a world of new transformative uses in the arts likely to 
remain unexploited due to the threat of copyrights’ limits on derivative works.”); see also 
infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing how postmodern works often appropriate 
existing works to build off of or comment on them); infra note 99 and accompanying text 
(predicting future conflicts between artists who make re-contextualized works of art and the 
holders of the original copyrights in question). 
 67. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 280-82 (discussing postmodernism as the product 
of a decline in the appeal of the modern movement). 
 68. ALLREFER.COM, Postmodernism, Architecture, in ALLREFER REFERENCE & 
ENCYCLOPEDIA RESOURCE, http://reference.allrefer.com/encyclopedia/P/postmoder 
.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2005). 
 69. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 280 n.37 (citing Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism 
and Consumer Society, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC:  ESSAYS ON POST-MODERN CULTURE 111-
15 (Hal Foster ed., 1983)) (characterizing the postmodern experiience in terms of pastich 
and schizophrenia). 
 70. For example, architecture from the 1960s until today has exhibited strong 
postmodern influences.  ALLREFER.COM, supra note 68.  Postmodern architecture represents 
a decisive break from the modernist architectural movement, a movement characterized 
largely by functional, yet often austere buildings.  Id.  In sharp contrast, “[p]ostmodern 
architecture is characterized by the incorporation of historical details in a hybrid rather than 
a pure style, by the use of decorative elements, by a more personal and exaggerated style, 
and by references to popular modes of building.”  Id. 
Postmodern art also reflects the re-contextualization trend.  Szymanski, supra note 7, at 
LEWIS OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:33:29 PM 
2005] SHADES OF GREY 281 
The increased use of digital music sampling demonstrates the 
postmodern influence on current popular music.  The invention of new 
ways to record and manipulate recorded music has led to the development 
of new forms of expression within music.71  Techniques for altering music 
have been increasingly adopted by rap and hip-hop artists, to the point 
where digital sound sampling has become pervasive throughout the music 
industry.72  The ability to combine and manipulate music has allowed 
artists to appropriate existing material and alter it to create new 
expression.73  This re-contextualization seems to fall comfortably within 
the larger realm of the postmodern movement.74 
One particular sub-genre of music, Bastard Pop or the Mash-up, closely 
reflects the postmodern method of re-contextualized expression.75  The 
                                                          
284.  Artists such as Robert Rauschenberg and Andy Warhol created works by silkscreening 
images onto canvas.  See id. (analyzing Rauschenberg’s technique); see also Comedy III 
Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001) (describing the technique and 
message of Warhol’s art).  By taking material currently available and reproducing it on the 
canvas, Rauschenberg demonstrates the postmodern belief in the futility of creating a new 
work by succumbing to “‘frank confiscation, quotation, excerption, accumulation, and 
repetition of already existing [texts].’” See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 284 (quoting David 
Harvey, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 54-55 (1989)) (contrasting Rauschenburg’s 
silkscreen of Reben’s Venus with Monet’s original interpretation of Titan’s Venus).  
 71. Digital music sampling is a technique used by artists to record music, potentially 
modify it using a computer, and then play it back, either by itself, or within a new context. 
Szymanski, supra note 7, at 275-77.  When artists digitally record sound, they use computer 
technology, such as the Musical Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI), which converts sounds 
into signals and stores them on a computer.  See Sanjek, supra note 9, at 608-09 (discussing 
how the increase in music technology has allowed even regular music fans to participate in 
music directly, by using computers to manipulate sounds).  This allows artists to then use 
the computer to manipulate the digitally recorded sounds, such as by adjusting the pitch or 
tempo of the music.  Szymanski, supra note 7, at 276-77. 
 72. Szymanski, supra note 7, at 278-80; see also Sanjek, supra note 9, at 610 (noting 
that although sampling is most prominent in hip hop and rap, it has also been increasingly 
common to other forms of music). 
 73. According to one commentator, the increased availability and lowered cost to 
sampling technology like the MIDI “has led us to enter what some have called an Age of 
Plunder and Orgy of Pastiche, as the MIDI permits the possibility of deconstructing any 
available recording or any recordable material into a novel construction.”  Sanjek, supra 
note 9, at 612.  Another commentator has added the view of the sampler as a postmodern 
artist who essentially builds music out of samples reflecting wildly divergent genres.  See 
Szymanski, supra note 7, at 283 (“The postmodern sample artist has a nomadic attitude, 
treating all genres of music as interchangeable building blocks and advocating ‘the 
reversibility of all the languages of the past.’ . . . The contiguity of clashing styles that 
results often bewilders traditional musical meaning.”). 
 74. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 283 .   
 75. Bastard Pop, also known as mash-up, is the name given to an increasingly popular 
genre of music, “which in its purest form, consists of the combination (usually by digital 
means) of the music from one song, with the a cappella [sic] from another.”  WordIQ.com, 
supra note 18.  Usually mash-up artists will choose music and a cappella lyrics from two 
different artists, generally from completely different genres.  Id.; see also A. Tacuma 
Roeback, Mash-ups combine music of diverse artists, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 17, 2004, at 
1D, available at http://www.tennessean.com/entertain 
ment/music/archives/04/04/50012849.shtml (discussing how combinations of Eminem and 
Alan Jackson, or Snoop Dogg and John Coltrane, exemplify the strange fusion of the 
Bastard Pop genre).  These artists attempt to combine (or re-contextualize) the works of 
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most famous (or infamous) Bastard Pop production belongs to DJ Danger 
Mouse, a Los Angeles based DJ who created an entire mash-up album by 
exclusively combining the a cappella lyrics of Jay-Z’s The Black Album 
with music taken solely from The Beatles’ The White Album.76 
The postmodern movement has led to the creation of re-contextualized 
music, which “favors eclecticism in form and musical genre, and often 
combines characteristics from different genres, or employs jump-cut 
sectionalization.”77  Many commentators argue that the use of sampling in 
general reflects the postmodern attitude of using materials of different 
genres as “building blocks” in the construction of new expressions.78 
Therefore, it seems only natural to find that Bastard Pop falls directly 
within the realm of postmodern expression.  These Bastard Pop artists who 
juxtapose two disparate works of music “strive for musical epiphanies that 
add up to considerably more than the sum of their parts.”79  In a sense, 
mash-up songs, and particularly mash-up albums, go beyond what many 
pop songs that feature samples attempt to do.  Within the Bastard Pop 
realm, artists take qualitatively large chunks exclusively from two sources, 
and combine them to create a re-contextualized work or a “totally different 
record.”80 
Bastard Pop songs and albums, perhaps even more than the common 
practice of digital music sampling, reflect the postmodern goal of creating 
new expression through the re-contextualization of divergent existing 
material.  The desire to promote the use of existing materials in new ways, 
filled with new expression, lies at the heart of the copyright fair use 
defense.81  Therefore, fair use should accept postmodern re-contextualized 
                                                          
divergent artists to create something new.  WordIQ.com, supra note 18. 
 76. See Roeback, supra note 75 (describing the background and popularity of The Grey 
Album); see also infra Part III (providing more detail on The Grey Album). 
 77. FARLEX, Postmodern Music, in ONLINE DICTIONARY, ENCYCLOPEDIA AND 
THESAURUS, http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Postmodern%20music (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2005).  The increasing prominence of postmodern influences in music is in part tied 
to technological advancement in recording technologies.  Id.  For example, the invention of 
magnetic tape allows artists to edit recordings.  Id.  Later, studio artists (led by The Beatles) 
started experimenting with multi-track recording and layering, which enabled them to push 
vocals to the foreground, while setting up the music as a “wall of sound” behind the vocals.  
Id.  Sampling was the next logical step—removing, using, or manipulating the background 
wall of noise.  Id. 
 78. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 283 (citations omitted) (arguing that the 
postmodern sample artist “punctur[es] one sign system in the name of another”). 
 79. WordIQ.com, supra note 18. 
 80. Roeback, supra note 75.  In contrast, many conventional pop artists will use a 
familiar sample as a background element to some new music simply to draw attention, while 
other DJs will create re-mixes of popular dance tracks by adding samples.  See Sanjek, 
supra note 9, at 612-13, 615 (listing examples of these re-mixes). 
 81. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1109 (noting that “all intellectual creative activity is in 
part derivative,” and that the fair use defense is therefore necessary to prevent the fact that 
“[m]onopoly protection of intellectual property that impeded referential analysis and the 
development of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative process”). 
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expression as a valid transformative use, thus allowing artists who have 
created re-contextualized works to claim the fair use defense in an 
infringement action.  It remains to be seen, however, whether such uses are 
sufficiently transformative. 
III. THE GREY ALBUM 
A. Background to Dispute 
In January 2004, Brian Burton, who goes by the name DJ Danger 
Mouse, fused the a capella lyrics of Jay-Z’s The Black Album with music 
taken exclusively from The Beatles’ The White Album to create an entirely 
new album he called The Grey Album.82  Danger Mouse pressed 3,000 
copies of his album,83 and claimed that he created and distributed the album 
solely as a promotional item84 and did not intend to sell it.85  Soon, 
however, word about the album spread, and enthusiastic file sharers began 
to distribute the album across the internet.86  Music reviewers also took 
note, with newspapers like The Boston Globe87 and magazines like Rolling 
Stone88 giving the album outstanding reviews. 
Danger Mouse, however, had not received permission from the rights 
                                                          
 82. Numerous articles provide further background on The Grey Album.  See generally 
Renee Graham, Jay-Z, the Beatles meet in ‘Grey’ area, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2004, at 
E1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/living/articles/2004/0 
2/10/jay_z_the_beatles_meet_in_grey_area (assessing in detail individual songs on The 
Grey Album); Shaheem Reid & Joseph Patel, Remixers Turn Jay-Z’s Black Album Grey, 
White, and Brown, MTV NEWS, Jan. 26, 2004, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/148 
4608/01262004/jay_z.jhtml (describing the remixes of Jay-Z’s a cappella release of The 
Black Album); Shachtman, supra note 11 (providing commentary on The Grey Album from 
EMI, music industry groups, copyright critics, DJ Danger Mouse, and others). 
 83. See Armstrong, supra note 12 (exploring different responses to The Grey Album’s 
copyright issues); See Joseph Patel, Producer of The Grey Album, Jay-Z/Beatles Mash-Up, 
Gets Served, MTV News, at http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/ 
1484938/20040210/jay_z.jhtml?headlines=true (Feb. 10, 2004) (describing legal actions 
surrounding The Grey Album). 
 84. See Patel, supra note 83 (noting that Danger Mouse intended the album to be a 
limited edition). 
 85. Lauren Gitlin, Jay-Z Meets Beatles, DJ Mixes Two Albums into One Classic, 
ROLLING STONE, Feb. 19, 2004, at 18, available at http://www.rollingstone.com (click on 
“News” tab then “Archive” and search for “Danger Mouse” using the drop down “Other” 
category).  In fact, Capitol Records, a division of EMI Group, seems to believe Danger 
Mouse’s claim that he just wanted people to hear his album, and told on-line distributors of 
his album that they may well be “interfering with the intention of the very artist whose 
rights you purport to vindicate” by continuing to distribute the album that he agreed to cease 
distributing himself.  Cease and Desist Letter from Capitol Records, to Downhillbattle.org 
(Feb. 23, 2004), http://www.downhillbattle.o 
rg/grey/emi_cd_letter.html [hereinafter Capitol Records]. 
 86. Shachtman, supra note 11. 
 87. See Graham, supra note 82 (labeling The Grey Album “fascinating” and “the most 
intriguing hip-hop album in recent memory”). 
 88. See Gitlin, supra note 85 (calling The Grey Album “an ingenious hip-hop record 
that sounds oddly ahead of its time”). 
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holders to the music and sound recording copyrights of either The Beatles’ 
music or Jay-Z’s album prior to his use of their materials.89  After the 
album spread across the internet, EMI Group (EMI), the owners of the 
sound recording rights to The White Album,90 issued a cease and desist 
letter to Danger Mouse, as well as to retailers, ordering them to cease 
distribution.91  Danger Mouse agreed to cease, and has stated that he does 
not think EMI will take any further legal action against him, due in part to 
his compliance and the small number of albums that he pressed.92 
B. Fair Use Analysis 
Although courts have not been entirely consistent in handling the issue 
of unauthorized de minimis sampling,93 they have largely agreed that the 
unauthorized taking of more than a few notes amounts to copyright 
infringement, and that such use cannot be saved by the fair use defense.94  
                                                          
 89. See Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 19 (listing five rights-holders potentially 
involved in The Grey Album copyright dispute); Shachtman, supra note 11 (noting that 
Danger Mouse had not even asked permission to use the songs). 
 90. See Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 19 (discussing the relevant rights holders 
involved in the dispute, including EMI Group, which owns the sound recordings to The 
Beatles’ The White Album). 
 91. See Shachtman, supra note 11 (specifying that EMI lawyers also sent cease and 
desist letters to certain record stores and eBay retailers selling The Grey Album). 
 92. Patel, supra note 83; Bill Werde, Defiant Downloads Rise from Underground, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at E3. 
The battle did not end with Danger Mouse’s agreement to cease distribution, however, as 
over 300 websites staged a one-day protest on the internet, which they called Grey Tuesday, 
where the websites either posted copies of The Grey Album on their websites for people to 
download, or they turned their websites grey for the day.  Id.  See Downhillbattle.org, Grey 
Tuesday:  Free the Grey Album, Feb. 24, 2004, http://www.greytuesday.org, for more 
background information on both The Grey Album and the Grey Tuesday protest, as well as 
links to coverage of both the album and protest by other news organizations. Capitol 
Records, a division of EMI, sent cease and desist letters to many of these websites, ordering 
them to stop.  Dean, supra note 11; see, e.g., Capitol Records, supra note 85 (demanding 
that Downhillbattle.org refrain from distributing The Grey Album).  Despite the threats of 
legal action, sites continued to host the album, and some new sites even joined after Capitol 
Records sent the letters.  Armstrong, supra note 12.  In response to publicity of the event, as 
well as word of mouth about the album, over 200,000 people downloaded the album on 
Grey Tuesday, and up to 1,000,000 people overall have downloaded the album.  See Danger 
Mouse, Bio, http://www.djdangermouse.com/index3.html (follow “Bio” hyperlink) (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2005) (estimating the total downloads at over 1,000,000); Andrew 
Unterberger, Playing God—Jay-Z:  The Black Album, STYLUS MAG., July 20, 2004, 
http://www.stylusmagazine.com/feature.php?ID=1121 (listing the number of Grey Tuesday 
downloads). 
 93. Compare Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
defendants’ use of three notes to be de minimis), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2004) (setting a bright line rule that the use of any 
sampled material, even if just a few notes, constitutes unfair infringement). 
 94. See generally Johnson, supra note 8, at 138, 140-56, 161-63 (examining the history 
of sampling and fair use, and arguing that samplers should be able to claim fair use); 
Szymanski, supra note 7, at 312-28 (providing an overview of sampling, copyright, and fair 
use, and concluding that most uses of sampled materials will be found unfair infringements, 
but suggesting that transformed samples may not suffer the same fate). 
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These courts have found that sampling, even with minor modification, 
represents the unfair copying of original material, and that such use can 
diminish the value of the original material, especially when the copied 
portion lies at the heart of what has been taken.95 
Nonetheless, courts seem less certain about whether a truly 
transformative sample should be allowed under the fair use doctrine.  As 
discussed in Part I, the decision usually turns on whether the court finds the 
work to be transformative enough.96  The court asks the following 
questions:  does the work have a valid transformative purpose, has it only 
taken as much as is necessary to meet that purpose, has the transformation 
diminished the chance of a negative market impact, has there been a large 
amount of new material added to the taken material, and does the resultant 
work feature a different tone or expression?  Although the Supreme Court 
seems to allow the use of copyrighted material in parodies based on the 
transformative doctrine,97 Justice Kennedy has cautioned against over-
broadening the doctrine, pointing out in his concurrence in Acuff-Rose that 
“[a]lmost any revamped modern version of a familiar composition can be 
construed as a ‘comment on the naiveté of the original’ because of the 
difference in style and because it will be amusing to hear how the old tune 
sounds in the new genre.”98  This concern may weigh heavily against any 
future sampler who argues that his or her work is transformative enough to 
qualify under the fair use doctrine. 
Although courts have remained averse to finding fair use in normal 
sampling infringement cases, the transformative doctrine offers a small 
glimmer of hope for artists who feel that their use of samples does serve a 
valid transformative purpose.  Despite the fact that the issue involving DJ 
Danger Mouse is moot, the facts of the situation provide an interesting 
hypothetical.  It is likely that a future conflict99 will pose the important 
                                                          
 95. See, e.g., Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291-92 (D. N.J. 1993) (finding 
copyright infringement where a defendant sampled a key portion of plaintiff’s work without 
authorization, noting that the portion taken was of great significance to the original, and 
thus, the infringement was likely to diminish the value of the original work); United States 
v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1014-15 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (declining to allow a defendant’s re-
recording of plaintiff’s work, despite some minor modifications, and holding that a finding 
of infringement would be proper as long as the material was still recognizable), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 96. See supra Part I (discussing how courts will likely find uses that add new material 
or expression to be valid fair uses because of their transformative value, but will likely reject 
non-transformative uses). 
 97. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that the transformative doctrine applies where the 
artist has infused the old material with new expression or meaning and the use alters the 
original in a way that does not affect the market for the original). 
 98. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (Acuff-Rose) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 583). 
 99. Although Danger Mouse complied with the cease and desist order and it is unlikely 
that EMI will pursue further legal action, see Patel, supra note 83 and accompanying text, 
the emerging trend of this genre will likely give rise to legal disputes.  The success of The 
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question of whether re-contextualized works of art that combine 
quantitatively large amounts of copyrighted material to create qualitatively 
new works qualify as valid transformative uses under the fair use 
doctrine.100 
As discussed in Part I, when considering whether an alleged infringer’s 
use is fair, courts will apply the four-factor fair use balancing test set out in 
the Copyright Act.101  Like most claims of fair use, Danger Mouse’s would 
likely turn on whether a court would find his use to be sufficiently 
transformative.102  All four factors of the fair use test consider the 
transformativeness of a new work, with each factor’s consideration of 
transformativeness affecting another factor’s consideration.  A finding of a 
transformative purpose would diminish the importance of the fact that the 
original work was an expressive work, allow for a greater amount of 
taking, and make a finding of market harm less likely.  This finding of a 
transformative purpose likely would stem from the addition of new 
material that creates a new tone or expression.103 
1. Purpose and character of the use 
Courts begin their consideration of the fair use defense by first 
examining “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
                                                          
Grey Album, the numerous other mash-ups featuring The Black Album, and the increasing 
popularity of the mash-up genre in general strongly suggests that artists will continue to 
create these works.  See Reid & Patel, supra note 82 (describing at least four remixes of Jay-
Z’s a cappella version of The Black Album).  On the other hand, EMI’s initial response to 
Danger Mouse and its issuance of cease and desist letters to those posting The Grey Album 
on-line suggests that copyright holders will continue to fight these works.  See, e.g., 
Roeback, supra note 75 (discussing the increasing popularity of mash-ups, and describing 
the wide range of artists used as source material, including artists from Eminem to Christina 
Aguilera to Alan Jackson); Shachtman, supra note 11 (comparing the views of activists who 
argue that artists like Danger Mouse should have the right to build off of copyrighted works 
with the policy of corporate music companies, like EMI, to use cease and desist letters “as a 
matter of course” whenever they suspect copyright violations); Unterberger, supra note 92 
(discussing how a number of artists have now made their own mash-up albums featuring 
The Black Album as source material, including Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album, The 
Double Black Album featuring Jay-Z on top of Metallica’s Black Album, and The Blue 
Album, which combines Jay-Z with Weezer). 
 100. This Comment examines The Grey Album under the fair use test only, and will not 
discuss whether the Grey Tuesday protestors have a fair use defense to their posting of the 
album online.  Also, given the rather substantial amounts of copyrighted material that 
Danger Mouse used, it is clear that his actions were infringing, so this section will only 
consider the fair use defense to copyright infringement. 
 101. The fair use factors include:  (1) “the purpose and character of the use”; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted material; (3) “the amount and substantiality of the portion used”; 
and (4) the effect of the use on the market for the original.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 102. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1110-13 (arguing that transformativeness is the most 
important element of the fair use analysis). 
 103. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (arguing that if a new work adds 
enough new expression or meaning, factors such as the work’s character or use and the 
impact on the market for the original work can be overcome). 
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use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”104  
The Supreme Court has noted that, within this first factor, courts should 
evaluate whether the new work would merely supersede the original 
material, or whether it reflects a transformative purpose.105  The question is 
whether the new work adds some new expression, meaning, or message 
that demonstrates a further purpose, such as commentary or criticism.106  In 
addition, the more transformative the work is, the less likely that any 
commercial intent or other factor will weigh against it.107 
Courts have not been entirely clear in determining what constitutes a 
valid transformative purpose.108  Most modern courts have adopted the 
Supreme Court’s parody-satire distinction, accepting the use of copyrighted 
material only if that material is used to convey a specific transformative 
message about the original work itself.109  In outlining why parody is a 
valid transformative use, the Court in Acuff-Rose relied largely on Judge 
Leval’s discussions on transformativeness, combined with the idea that 
parody has redeeming social value.110  Leval argued that if the secondary 
use “merely repackages or republishes the original,” it would effectively 
duplicate or “supersede” the original, and that such a use is invalid.111  The 
                                                          
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). 
 105. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
(citing Leval, supra note 4, at 1111) (emphasizing that the primary issue is whether the 
work is transformative). 
 106. Id.; see also Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998) (declining to find defendant’s use of plaintiff’s Godzilla pictures and plot 
summaries to be fair, but noting that if the defendant’s book had been “dominated by 
commentary and critique, then it would most likely fall into the realm of fair use”). 
 107. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 108. See supra Part I.B (comparing the treatment by courts of fair use and 
transformativeness in parodies, satires, and other contexts). 
 109. In drawing the parody-satire distinction, the Acuff-Rose Court argued that parody 
requires the use of material that is at least reminiscent of the targeted work because parody 
aims to imitate and manipulate the form, style, or content of a work so as to criticize or 
make fun of the work itself.  Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580-81; see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 
F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that “the copied work must be, at least in part, an 
object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the original work”).  In 
contrast, satire uses the form, style, or content of a familiar work in order to make fun of 
something else.  Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580-81; cf. Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. 
Supp. 2d 127, 137-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (claiming that documentaries should be allowed to 
use samples of copyrighted expression belonging to the subjects they document in the same 
way that parodies require using portions of the original work to make their point). 
 110. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 4, at 1111). 
 111. Leval, supra note 4, at 1111; see, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to find the alteration of music into MP3 format 
as an adequate transformation); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108-09 
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the mere retransmission of a work in a new medium (over a 
phone line) was not fair use since the character of the original broadcast was left intact).  But 
see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a 
secondary user has a valid fair use claim to the exact reproduction of material in a different 
format if that format is used for a different purpose, such as when an image is rescaled into a 
smaller size for use on an internet search engine because the thumbnail image would not be 
(nor could it be) used for the same purpose as the larger image). 
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Supreme Court adopted Leval’s characterization of transformativeness, and 
similarly tied the creation of transformative works to the goals of copyright 
itself:  “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”112 
Even beyond parodies, if the secondary user builds on the original work 
by adding new value, insights, expressions, or information, then that 
transformative use reflects the goal of the fair use doctrine.113  For instance, 
courts have accepted non-parodies as transformative uses when the 
secondary user has added new material that sufficiently criticizes or alters 
the original,114 while rejecting claims of transformativeness when there has 
not been a sufficient change in expression.115 
                                                          
 112. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 4, at 1111).  Leval suggests 
that criticism, commentary, parody, symbolism, and aesthetic declarations are among the 
potential transformative uses.  Leval, supra note 4, at 1111; see also Comedy III Prods., Inc. 
v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (arguing that because copyright and the First 
Amendment both encourage creativity and expression, transformative works are “especially 
worthy of First Amendment protection” because, although a state’s interest in rewarding the 
original author will outweigh the rights of an infringer who makes literal copies, the state’s 
interest will be less in cases where the secondary user distorts the original to the point where 
market harm is unlikely). 
 113. Leval, supra note 4, at 1111.  In fact, while Acuff-Rose adopted Leval’s discussion 
of transformativeness within the context of parodies, see supra note 112 and accompanying 
text, Leval himself lists parody as only one of many possible transformational uses, see 
Leval, supra note 4, at 1111 (listing symbolism and aesthetic declarations as potentially 
transformative uses). 
 114. See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding 
that defendant’s addition of criticism and commentary to quotations of copyrighted material 
in a report meant to expose the plaintiff’s organization as a cult sufficiently transformed the 
work); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 519-21 (7th Cir. 2002) (arguing that a 
Beanie Babies collector’s guide had a fair use claim because the addition of useful material 
on pricing to the copyrighted pictures of the toys created a complementary instead of a 
substitute product); Hofheinz, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (allowing defendant’s use of clips of 
plaintiff’s monster films within a documentary which examined the genre, noting that “[t]he 
documentary appears intended to add something of value rather than simply copying the 
copyrighted expression that it documents”). 
 115. See, e.g., Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 519 (rejecting the fair use claim of a secondary user 
who merely reprinted copyrighted pictures of Beanie Babies in a picture book because it 
was a substitute product); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 
142-43 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying a fair use claim by secondary users who copied large 
amounts of quotations, pictures, and other materials from the television show Seinfeld for 
use in a trivia book on the show, noting that “[a]ny transformative purpose . . . is slight to 
non-existent” because the authors failed meaningfully to comment on or criticize the show); 
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to 
find defendant’s use of a copyrighted poster in the backdrop of a television show to be 
transformative because the poster was used for the same decorative purpose as the original); 
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1375 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding 
that the defendant’s use of copyrighted material in extensive plot summaries more closely 
amounted to an abridgment than a validly transformative use, but noting that discussions of 
plot may be allowed as long as the author builds off of it and adds criticism or commentary). 
Courts have consistently rejected claims of transformativeness when the infringer merely 
reproduces the material in another format.  See, e.g., A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1015 
(declining to find the alteration of music into MP3 format as an adequate transformation); 
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
defendant’s claim that photocopying of copyrighted articles constituted a transformative 
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In addition to transformativeness, however, courts must also consider the 
commercial or non-commercial purpose of the secondary use.116  
According to the Supreme Court, a commercial use will generally weigh 
against the secondary use.117  In Acuff-Rose, however, the Court pointed out 
that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use.”118  The Court explained that the commercial nature of 
the work is merely one factor and not dispositive, especially considering 
that the uses listed in the fair use statute itself could be deemed 
commercial.119  In this way, the Court established a balancing test within 
the first fair use factor itself:  heavily transformative works will likely 
weigh in favor of the defendant (despite a commercial purpose), while 
weak or non-transformative uses will weigh against the defendant (even if 
educational). 
To succeed in the first factor, an artist like Danger Mouse would have to 
argue that the use of copyrighted material constitutes a valid transformative 
use.120  This argument is based on the theory that re-contextualized works, 
as forms of postmodern art, convey a social benefit and infuse new 
expressions and meanings into the works that are taken, and that the new 
works critique or comment directly on the materials taken through the 
                                                          
purpose). 
 116. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000) (stating that courts should consider “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes” (emphasis added)). 
 117. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) 
(stating that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair 
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright”). 
 118. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 119. See id. at 584-85 (stating that “[i]f, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force 
against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative 
uses listed in the preamble paragraph of [17 U.S.C.] § 107”); see also NXIVM Corp., 364 
F.3d at 478 (approving the lower court’s action in discounting the importance of the 
secondary work’s commercial nature after finding it to be sufficiently transformative); 
Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1966) (citations 
omitted) (finding that many courts have allowed a fair use claim even where the use was 
partly motivated by commercial gain, and noting that a finding of commercial gain would be 
more appropriate if the purpose of the use was purely commercial and there was no 
possibility to advance the science or the arts).  But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (holding that the issue is not whether the sole 
motive is commercial, but “whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price”). 
 120. The artist would have to be careful to note that the combination of the two sources 
leads to an altered experience instead of the mere re-transmission of the two sources, since 
re-transmission of copyrighted material, even within a new format or medium, is not 
protectable.  See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(finding that defendant’s retransmission of plaintiff’s work was not fair use since the 
character of the original broadcast was left intact).  The reviews of The Grey Album seem to 
indicate that this would not be a problem.  See infra note 122 and accompanying text 
(arguing that The Grey Album acts like a parody in that it references famous artists and 
creates new expression by juxtaposing them). 
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juxtaposition that is created.121  Artists must establish that re-
contextualization more closely resembles valid transformative uses like 
criticism, commentary, or parody because it uses works to comment on 
them directly,122 as opposed to satire, which conveys a different message 
and merely uses the material to attract attention.123  In contrast, copyright 
owners would have to make the artist’s effort seem more like that of a 
conventional sampler.  For example, EMI could cite one pair of reviewers 
who suggested that Danger Mouse’s success stemmed from his ability to 
manipulate The Beatles’ music in such a way as to match the sentiments of 
the original Jay-Z songs.124 
                                                          
 121. Infinity Broad. Corp., 150 F.3d at 108-09. 
 122. The Second Circuit has argued that fair use allows parodies because it provides the 
audience with a clear reference to the separate, underlying work, either because the copied 
material is famous, or because the secondary user attributes the taking to the original artist.  
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (arguing that the original work must 
be the subject of the parody or manipulation so as to fulfill the public recognition of the 
original work).  Although The Grey Album is clearly not a parody, this rule of public 
awareness would seemingly be met, since The Beatles and Jay-Z are both famous, and since 
Danger Mouse’s title of the album is a direct reference to the combination of the names of 
the two combined albums.  See Graham, supra note 82 (explaining the genesis of The Grey 
Album).  Furthermore, the album demonstrates how re-contextualized works create their 
new expression by the juxtaposition of different materials—therefore, the re-contextualized 
works, even more than parodies, must necessarily use elements of the existing works.  See 
Szymanski, supra note 7, at 283 (discussing how postmodern artists weave different genres 
of music together to create novel works). 
 123. A number of music reviewers have actually discussed the transformative effect of 
The Grey Album.  See, e.g., Eric Seguy, DJ Dangermouse:  The Grey Album, STYLUS MAG., 
Mar. 9, 2004, http://www.stylusmagazine.com/review.php?ID=1794 (ascribing the success 
of the mash-up album to Danger Mouse’s ability to break apart melodies by The Beatles, 
and then to use these pieces in incredibly inventive ways which sometimes “transform stale 
sentiments” in the original Jay-Z work, and sometimes work with the lyrics by adding new 
expression or meaning to “Jay-Z’s intricate wordplay”).  In fact, the reviewer noted that the 
album seems weakest when Danger Mouse simply loops bass-heavy Beatles’ riffs behind 
the Jay-Z tracks.  Id.  This observation helps demonstrate the difference between the 
sampler and the artist who attempts a larger re-contextualization.  Danger Mouse’s success 
stemmed from his transformation of the music by using it in exciting ways that helped shine 
new light on both The Beatles’ music and Jay-Z’s lyrics, and he showed occasional 
weakness in moments where he seemed most like a sampling artist.  See id.; see also 
Graham, supra note 82 (noting how Danger Mouse was able to use The Beatles in ways that 
give Jay-Z’s music “great urgency and energy,” and applauding Danger Mouse’s ability to 
bring The Beatles “into the hip hop generation while giving props to the timeless innovation 
of the band, which through its boundary-breaking musical philosophy may have helped pave 
the way for the free-flowing deconstruction of rap music.”).  But see Reid & Patel, supra 
note 82 (explaining how The Grey Album succeeded not due to new expression, but to the 
way in which Danger Mouse was able to engineer The Beatles’ music to reflect the 
personalities of the original Jay-Z songs). 
These positive reviews help demonstrate how Danger Mouse’s album could be 
considered validly transformative.  Cf. Leval, supra note 4, at 1111 (considering a work that 
adds new value, insights, or expressions to the original work to be transformative).  The 
reviewers focus on the new expression that Danger Mouse created and the new depths of 
understanding that he discovered by manipulating the works.  Cf. id. (distinguishing 
between use that merely “repackages and republishes the original” and use that “adds value 
to the original” and transforms the work into a “creation of new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings,” warranting protection by the fair use doctrine). 
 124. See Reid & Patel, supra note 82 (stating how “Danger Mouse renders the same 
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Secondary users would also have to respond to the first factor’s 
consideration of the commercial or non-commercial nature of the product.  
This factor, however, may not affect them too negatively.  As discussed 
above, the Supreme Court has noted that this is merely one factor among 
many, and that the greater amount of transformative value added, the less 
likely a finding of commercial purpose will weigh against the defendant.125 
In terms of The Grey Album, reviewers have widely praised Danger 
Mouse’s ability to combine artists of different musical genres and eras in 
such a way as to create a “captivating”126 or “ingenious”127 new work.  
Because these reviewers have so often commented on the new expression 
created, Danger Mouse could have a credible argument that his work 
should be considered a valid transformative use.128  These reviews provide 
evidence that listeners were able to clearly identify the new expression 
                                                          
sentiment [as the Jay-Z original] by flipping the shuffling drums and mournful piano of [The 
Beatles’] ‘While My Guitar Gently Weeps’”). 
EMI could also claim that Danger Mouse’s actions do not constitute fair use because they 
reproduce large amounts of materials for the same purpose (entertainment) as the originals.  
See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 
2000) (finding defendant’s copying of plaintiff’s book to be unfair since it was for the same 
purpose of religious practice, noting that the defendant did not engage in any “‘intellectual 
labor [or] judgment’” in the reproduction of the materials (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. 
Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841))).  In response, Danger Mouse could assert that his 
combination of the materials was skilled, and did involve such intellectual labor and 
judgment, as evidenced by the many reviewers who could not tell exactly what music came 
from which Beatles’ song.  See infra note 157 (describing reviewers’ comments on the 
works’ unrecognizable nature). 
 125. See supra note 118-119 and accompanying text (explaining the Acuff-Rose Court’s 
view that a work’s commercial nature is not dispositive).  In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), the Court held that the key to the commercial 
versus non-commercial factor “is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain 
but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without 
paying the customary price.”  Id. at 562.  The Court then went on to note, however, that The 
Nation magazine’s invalid purpose of copying elements of President Ford’s autobiography 
stemmed from its desire to scoop Time magazine.  Id.  This suggests that the Court was 
concerned with The Nation’s creation of a substitute product, and also with its bad faith in 
doing so.  In contrast, Danger Mouse’s album, as discussed in the text, does not serve as a 
substitute for either The Beatles or Jay-Z’s music.  Infra notes 157-158 and accompanying 
text. 
 126. Graham, supra note 82. 
 127. Gitlin, supra note 85. 
 128. Although it is uncertain whether courts would consider what critics and 
commentators have to say about a given new work, the Court in Acuff-Rose affirmed Justice 
Holmes’s admonition that “‘[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits,” suggesting that judges will have to look beyond their 
own views on a work.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 582 
(1994) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).  
Turning to evidence such as criticism and commentary seems a logical step—courts have 
done so in other contexts.  Cf. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 
1999) (holding that, in a case under the Visual Artists Rights Act, whether a work is of 
“recognized stature” is determined via expert testimony, and upholding a lower court 
decision which considered newspaper articles and letters when assessing the work in 
question’s stature). 
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created out of the juxtaposition, thus reflecting Leval’s conception of what 
fair use should protect. 129  If this is the case, then the commercial purpose 
portion of the first factor becomes less important, and Danger Mouse 
would have a strong chance of prevailing under the first factor. 
2. Nature of the copyrighted work 
Under the second factor, courts must examine the “nature of the 
copyrighted work.”130  Essentially, courts recognize that certain original 
works more closely reflect the “core of intended copyright protection than 
others,” and that the taking of such works will weigh against the secondary 
user.131  Courts have determined that fictional works more closely reflect 
copyright’s intended goals than do factual works, since “the law generally 
recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of 
fiction or fantasy.”132  Fictional works or works of creative expression are 
therefore afforded more protection under copyright laws, which makes it 
harder to assert a fair use defense.  However, courts must still consider this 
factor in light of the purpose of the use since some valid uses, like parody, 
require the use of fictional material.133 
The Grey Album takes material from two expressive works; therefore, 
the second factor would tilt against Danger Mouse.  However, applying the 
Court’s caveat from Acuff-Rose that parodies will necessarily require the 
use of expressive works, Danger Mouse could argue that re-contextualized 
works like mash-ups will also often, if not invariably, take portions of 
creative, expressive works.134  Therefore, if courts would be willing to find 
re-contextualization to be a valid transformative use, then courts would also 
limit the extent to which the second factor tends to disfavor the 
defendant.135 
                                                          
 129. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1111 (arguing that fair use was intended to protect 
transformative works that exhibit new expressions, insights, or understandings). 
 130. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000). 
 131. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586 (holding that it will be harder for defendants to 
prevail on a fair use claim when they have copied works closer to “the core of intended 
copyright protection,” and that creative expression falls within that category of core works). 
 132. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (citation 
omitted); see also Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 
1966) (arguing that secondary users should be able to draw upon prior biographies under the 
fair use doctrine because there is a great public benefit in ensuring that historical or 
biographical works are disseminated to the public). 
 133. For example, in Acuff-Rose, despite holding that Orbison’s work exhibited the type 
of creative expression that copyright protects, the Court noted that “[t]his fact, however, is 
not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from 
the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, 
expressive works.”  510 U.S. at 586. 
 134. See WordIQ.com, supra note 18 (defining the mash-up album as one which 
exclusively uses the a capella lyrics of one album and the music of another). 
 135. If a court was willing to hold that postmodern artists creating re-contextualized 
works almost invariably used existing, creative material in the same way that a parodist 
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3. Amount and substantiality of the portion used 
Courts next consider “the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”136 and determine if that 
amount is reasonable considering the purpose of the use.137  Additionally, 
courts must be mindful of the Supreme Court’s recognition that the “extent 
of permissible copying varies with the purpose and the character of the 
use.”138  For instance, the Court has held that a “parody must be able to 
‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical 
wit recognizable.”139  The Court therefore recognizes that a valid 
transformative purpose like parody will require artists to take a portion of 
the copyrighted material to express their point.  Exactly how much artists 
are allowed to use will depend on the purpose they assert,140 but the Court 
noted that there usually will be some upper limit since the greater the 
amount used, the more likely there will be market substitution.141  The 
Supreme Court has noted, however, that in some instances a secondary user 
may use the entirety of the copyrighted work, such as where a person at 
home records a television program in order to watch it later.142 
This factor probably presents the largest obstacle to finding that a re-
contextualized work constitutes fair use based on the quantitatively large 
amount of copyrighted material that will generally be used.143  For 
                                                          
almost invariably uses creative, existing material, then the court would likely also extend the 
Acuff-Rose view that the second factor becomes less important because it is something that a 
potential fair user (re-contextualist or parodist) would be unable to get around.  Supra note 
133 and accompanying text. 
 136. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000). 
 137. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 138. Id. at 586-87. 
 139. See id. at 588-89 (noting that 2 Live Crew took the familiar opening bass riff and 
first line from Orbison’s song to conjure up the original, but that 2 Live Crew went on to 
make substantial changes from the Orbison lyrics to create its parody). 
 140. See id. at 588 (postulating that reasonable use will depend on “the extent to which 
the song’s overriding purpose and character is to parody the original”). 
 141. See id. (limiting the allowance of a use where there is a “likelihood that the parody 
may serve as a market substitute for the original”).  The Second Circuit has interpreted 
Acuff-Rose as suggesting that parodies will allow even more than necessary to simply 
conjure up the original, leading it to comment that such an “approach leaves the third factor 
with little, if any, weight against fair use so long as the first and fourth factors favor the 
parodist.”  See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that defendant’s use of more copyrightable expression than was necessary to 
conjure up the plaintiff’s picture did not weigh against the defendant, since the defendant 
also evidenced a valid purpose under the first factor and there was no significant negative 
market impact under the fourth factor). 
 142. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).  
But see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming that there are 
limitations to the extent that even parodies can use copyrighted materials). 
 143. Even small amounts can be too much.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (finding that although the infringers had used only an 
insubstantial portion of the plaintiff’s book, they had appropriated the heart of the book); see 
also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(setting a bright line rule that the use of any sampled material, even if just a few notes, 
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example, The Grey Album uses almost every lyric of Jay-Z’s The Black 
Album, and also uses a fairly large amount of music from The White 
Album,144 certainly far more than the de minimis amount that some courts 
have allowed.145  However, courts must consider the amount taken in light 
of the purpose of the use.  Re-contextualized works, like parodies, 
necessitate the use of copyrighted material to reference and build off of the 
original source.  However, a re-contextualized work like a mash-up album 
will require the use of almost all of the copyrighted material in question to 
effectively convey its purpose, since mash-ups by definition use the a 
capella lyrics from one source over the stylistically different music of 
another source.146  Mash-up artists convey their purpose through the forced 
juxtaposition of seemingly irreconcilable works which, through the 
creativity and skill of these artists, often end up expressing interesting or 
compelling new visions.147  This expressive purpose therefore requires a 
greater taking than a parody, which must simply conjure up the original 
work. 
An artist certainly would face an uphill battle in convincing courts, 
which are quite averse to allowing the use of even minor samples, that they 
should allow large scale takings.  However, if courts are willing to accept 
re-contextualization as a valid transformative purpose because it is a 
common postmodern form of expression, then courts must be more lenient 
about allowing artists to use as much as is necessary to successfully convey 
their intended expressions.148 
4. Effect of the use on the market 
The final fair use factor instructs the courts to consider “the effect of the 
                                                          
constitutes unfair infringement). 
 144. See Capitol Records, supra note 85 (stating how The Grey Album includes 
“extensive samples” from The White Album, including material from at least fifteen 
different songs). 
 145. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (comparing the Ninth Circuit’s view in 
Newton v. Diamond, that a sample with three notes constituted a de minimis use with the 
Sixth Circuit’s bright line rule against sampling of any material, no matter how little in 
Bridgeport Music, Inc.). 
 146. WordIQ.com, supra note 18. 
 147. See supra Part II (outlining the purpose of the mash-up album). 
 148. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994) 
(discussing how the amount that a secondary user may copy will depend on the purpose of 
the new work).  This means that a court would have to extend even greater protection to re-
contextualized works than to parodies, based on the recognition that re-contextualized works 
require the use of greater portions.  Id.  Although courts have set limits on the amount that 
parodies can take, there is the possibility that certain courts would be amenable to the larger 
taking, so long as the new work was still referential to the existing one by incorporating and 
acknowledging the old work within the new one.  Id.; see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 
301, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that there are limits to the amount parodies can take, but 
also noting that fair use’s allowance of parody derives from the fact that it allows the 
audience to recognize the original work). 
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use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”149  
Courts must determine “‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of 
the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially 
adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.”150  Furthermore, 
courts must also consider not only the direct harm that the use poses to the 
original’s market, but also any effect that it may have on the market for 
derivative works by the original author.151  The Supreme Court has 
considered this to be the most important factor in the fair use test.152  At 
one time, the Court suggested that a finding that the new use was 
commercial would create a presumption that it would have a negative 
market impact on the original.153  However, in Acuff-Rose, the Court 
retreated from this position by concluding that certain transformative uses, 
although commercial, would likely pose far less harm to the original 
product’s market, since parodies and the originals they mock “usually serve 
different market functions.”154 
In terms of the impact on a derivative market, Acuff-Rose suggested that 
courts must consider whether the use is the type that “creators of original 
works would in general develop or license others to develop.”155  Since it is 
highly unlikely that an author would develop or license others to develop 
works that criticize their original work, the Court concluded that “there is 
no protectable derivative market for criticism.”156 
An artist like Danger Mouse faces some difficulty with this factor.  For 
example, Danger Mouse’s work potentially affects the primary and 
derivative markets of The Beatles and Jay-Z.  Danger Mouse’s best chance 
                                                          
 149. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
 150. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590 (citation omitted). 
 151. Id.; see, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 142-43 
(2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant’s creation of a trivia book based on material taken 
from Seinfeld violated the plaintiff’s right to produce derivative works). 
 152. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985) 
(citing the fourth factor as “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,” and 
agreeing that fair use should be limited to instances where the copying does not impair the 
market for the original) (citation omitted). 
 153. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) 
(suggesting that the likelihood of market harm could be presumed if the secondary use had a 
commercial purpose, while if the secondary use was non-commercial, then the market harm 
would have to be proved). 
 154. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591; see also Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 
(7th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing secondary uses between complementary products which 
feature new materials and are more likely to be fair use, and substitute products that 
essentially supersede the market for the original and are thus unlikely to be fair use). 
 155. Acuff Rose, 510 U.S. at 592. 
 156. See id. (finding that there was no derivative market for Roy Orbison parodies, since 
it was unlikely that Orbison would license his work for parody).  However, the Court went 
on to note that 2 Live Crew’s work was not only a parody, but also contained rap music, that 
Orbison could have licensed his work for use in derivative rap works, and therefore, 2 Live 
Crew needed to establish on remand that their work did not significantly affect this 
derivative market.  Id. at 592-94. 
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at succeeding under this factor would be to assert that his work is (1) non-
commercial and (2) a highly transformative work, and that the combination 
of these factors makes market substitution unlikely. 
While Danger Mouse seized a large portion of The White Album, he 
chopped it up and rearranged it extensively, leading reviewers to have to 
guess which samples came from which Beatles’ songs.157  In fact, many 
reviewers suggested that the beauty of Danger Mouse’s work is that it 
could bring The Beatles into the hip hop generation, suggesting that if 
anything, there would be a positive impact on the market for The White 
Album.158 
Regarding The Beatles’ market for derivative goods, Danger Mouse 
would stand on less firm ground.  The increasing popularity of the mash-up 
genre suggests that artists may very well desire to license their works in 
any way that will make them money or bring them added recognition.159  If 
this is the case, then Danger Mouse would have to argue that EMI (as 
owner of the rights to The Beatles’ music) foreclosed any potential 
derivative market by universally rejecting any and all access to The 
Beatles’ music for sampling purposes.160  Many critics see these types of 
                                                          
 157. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 82 (noting that Danger Mouse’s manipulation of The 
Beatles’ material goes so far at times as to make the original “nearly unrecognizable”); 
Roeback, supra note 75 (listing only five of The Grey Album tracks with their source 
material under the header “here’s what we know”). 
 158. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 82 (describing the album as 2004’s most captivating 
album since Danger Mouse was able to bring “[t]he Beatles into the hip hop generation”); 
Reid & Patel, supra note 82 (opining that The Grey Album may open up the world of classic 
rock to “rap fans who didn’t know they like the Beatles”). 
However, even a showing that the new work may benefit the old work is not enough on 
its own to excuse the secondary use.  See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590 n.21 (citing Leval, 
supra note 4, at 1124 n.84) (discussing Judge Leval’s example that a film producer’s 
unauthorized use of an unknown song may bring that song fame, but that it does not 
necessarily mean that the use is fair).  Courts must continue to weigh the other factors.  Id. 
 159. In fact, Jay-Z paired up with Linkin Park at a live performance to mash-up their 
respective works on the first episode of “MTV Ultimate Mash-Ups.”  MTV Ultimate Mash-
ups:  Jay-Z vs. Linkin Park (MTV television broadcast Nov. 10, 2004).  If the recent 
mainstream success of the mash-up genre can be traced in part to the critical acclaim 
surrounding Danger Mouse’s work, then it seems again like copyright should allow such 
works to occur.  After all, if EMI had been able to prevent the distribution of The Grey 
Album entirely, then perhaps major media sources like The Boston Globe, Rolling Stone, and 
The New York Times would not have noticed the new trend.  See Roeback, supra note 75 
(citing The Grey Album as the most famous mash-up, and concluding that the circulation of 
the album over the internet and the subsequent media coverage amounted to “tons of 
priceless publicity”); see also Jon Wiederhorn, Jay-Z and Linkin Park Show Danger Mouse 
How It’s Done, MTV NEWS, Oct. 10, 2004, 
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1491889/20041004/jay_z.jhtml?headli 
nes=true (discussing how Jay-Z developed the idea to do a mash-up with Linkin Park’s 
Mike Shinoda after hearing about Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album). 
 160. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 83 (noting that despite many re-mixes or mash-ups 
involving Jay-Z’s album, The Grey Album was “the only one that dared to use music from 
the Beatles’ guarded catalog”); Shachtman, supra note 11 (stating that the Beatles’ “song 
catalog has been notoriously off-limits to hip-hop and dance-music producers’ 
manipulations”); Werde, supra note 92 (stating that The Beatles will not allow their music 
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refusals (or the prohibitively high licensing costs established by other rights 
holders) as unfairly restrictive of new creative expressions.161  If artists or 
copyright holders do not allow access to their music, even via licensing, 
then perhaps there is no viable derivative market for the courts to consider.  
Courts will have to weigh the right of the original artist to withhold music 
from the public domain versus the rights of other artists to use that original 
material in innovative and transformative new ways which will benefit the 
public.162  If courts want to stay true to copyright’s goal of ensuring that 
creative new works get to the public, then they may want to allow such 
uses even in the face of stubborn refusals to license.163  One legal 
commentator has even suggested that the fair use defense should be used to 
directly address market failures, such as instances when bargaining is 
                                                          
to be sampled). 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation goes even further, arguing that EMI does not even 
own any federal copyrights in The White Album at all, since federal copyright does not 
protect sound recordings made prior to 1972.  See Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 19 
(arguing that if this is the case, EMI may have no valid complaint against Danger Mouse or 
the Grey Tuesday protestors except under state laws). 
 161. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 11 (offering the view of Downhillbattle.org’s co-founder 
(the website that organized the Grey Tuesday protest) that “‘[m]usicians have a right to 
make albums like The Grey Album, and when something great and culturally important like 
this album gets made, the public has a right to hear it.’”); Shachtman, supra note 11 
(quoting Harvard Law School professor Jonathan Zittrain as saying that such refusal 
characterizes “‘copyright as a means of control, rather than a means of profit,’” and that 
copyright is supposed to ensure that artists make money, not that they are able to prevent the 
creativity of others). 
Some critics have wondered why EMI will not retroactively license the rights to Danger 
Mouse, since his album could clearly bring them a fair amount of money.  Dean, supra note 
11.  However, others have noted that licensing fees often run so high; mash-up artists that 
must split fees amongst the two different artists would essentially have to pay out everything 
that they made.  See Werde, supra note 92 (reporting that a copyright holder will often 
request up to fifty percent of the publishing rights for a new song, so that mash-up artists 
who use two sources would have to sign away up to one hundred percent of the publishing 
rights to their new songs). 
 162. In fact, this balance lies at the heart of the very purpose of copyright protection.  See 
supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing that the purpose of copyright law is to 
promote the expression of new and colorful ideas while protecting original work product).  
But see Tehranian, supra note 26 (arguing that since Folsom v. Marsh, courts have begun 
shifting away from this utilitarian purpose towards one founded in natural law). 
 163. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 592 (finding parody to be fair use in part due to the fact 
that there is no derivative market for criticism, since artists are unlikely to license works to 
others that want to make fun of them).  Similarly, artists may be unlikely to license works to 
young, unknown artists who may alter their music in ways that they do not want.  See 
Roeback, supra note 75 (citing the Beastie Boys as one example of an artist who has refused 
to authorize a license to a Belgian DJ duo).  If courts adopt the view that re-contextualized 
works can provide valuable social commentary, then they may allow it despite refusals.  See 
Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 19 (suggesting that although a case-by-case consideration 
is warranted, a credible fair use defense may circumvent a copyright infringement claim).  
Courts have found a re-contextualized work to be transformative and therefore most likely 
fair use.  See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001) 
(citation omitted) (arguing that Andy Warhol’s silkscreening of celebrities provided ironic 
social commentary). 
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prohibitively expensive.164  Another commentator addressed this issue 
specifically in light of the Acuff-Rose case, which he felt demonstrated the 
fact that licensing transactions often fail for a number of reasons, such as 
times where an old artist declines to license his or her work to a new one 
simply because he or she does not like what the new artist intends to do.165 
Jay-Z, had he decided to protest Danger Mouse, would stand a better 
chance than The Beatles at defeating the fair use claim because his work is 
used almost in its entirety.  The Grey Album, as a mash-up album, seizes 
almost all of the original Jay-Z lyrics and lays them over altered music 
from The Beatles’ The White Album.  Danger Mouse did not transform Jay-
Z’s lyrics in the same way that he transformed The Beatles’ music.166  
However, Danger Mouse could assert that the transformation of Jay-Z’s 
work comes primarily through the re-contextualization itself, that is, that 
Jay-Z’s lyrics are in a sense altered when paired with classic rock instead of 
the original music.167  If that were the case, Danger Mouse could further 
claim that the new sound would in no way impair Jay-Z’s primary market, 
as listeners would not consider the music to be the same. 
Jay-Z’s derivative market may also have been affected. The increasing 
popularity of the mash-up movement tends to curtail any argument that 
there is no derivative market in re-contextualized works.168  If Jay-Z were 
to bring a lawsuit, Danger Mouse could only claim that his work was 
noncommercial.  Jay-Z’s inaction, however, suggests that many currently 
                                                          
 164. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economics 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982) 
(stating that “[f]air use should be awarded to the defendant . . . when (1) market failure is 
present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use 
would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner”). 
 165. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and 
the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 309 (1993) (noting, in particular, that 
the plaintiffs refused the defendants’ requests for a license and yet later claimed that the 
defendants’ use was unfair since it undermined their economic rights). 
 166. See, e.g., Corey Moss, Grey Album Producer Danger Mouse Explains How He Did 
It, MTV NEWS, Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1485693/20040311/j 
ay_z.jhtml?headlines=true (presenting Danger Mouse’s explanation of how he mixed the 
two albums together, including discussion of how Danger Mouse had to score all thirty 
songs on The White Album and painstakingly create beats from the original materials, which 
he could then sync to the lyrics he lifted completely from Jay-Z’s The Black Album). 
 167. A reviewer commented that Danger Mouse used The Beatles’ music in incredibly 
inventive ways which sometimes “transform stale sentiments” in the original Jay-Z work, 
and sometimes work with the lyrics by adding new expression or meaning to “Jay-Z’s 
intricate wordplay.”  Seguy, supra note 123. 
 168. In fact, MTV’s new show “MTV Ultimate Mash-Ups” featured a live mash-up of 
Jay-Z and Linkin Park in its very first episode.  Guzman, supra note 159; MTV Ultimate 
Mash-Ups, supra note 159.  Furthermore, Jay-Z fully realized the potential uses of his 
album, and directly attempted to capitalize on these uses by releasing an a capella version of 
his album.  According to his sound engineer, he released the lyrics-only version so that DJs 
could “re-mix the hell out of it.”  Shachtman, supra note 11; Reid & Patel, supra note 82.  
This demonstrates that there is a thriving derivative market for re-contextualization, 
especially for artists like Jay-Z. 
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popular artists may in fact understand the importance of not inhibiting 
creativity. Nevertheless, a court would likely find that Jay-Z’s derivative 
market had been negatively affected. 
Ultimately, this factor would largely boil down to (1) how transformative 
a court would find the work and (2) whether a court would accept Danger 
Mouse’s claim that it was meant to be non-commercial. 
5. Other factors—The amount added and new expression 
In addition to the four factors discussed above, courts have also 
commented on the amount of new material that a secondary user has added 
to the original material, and the resulting change in tone or expression 
created by the new additions.169  Courts are more likely to find a use 
transformative, thus increasing its chances of being found a valid fair use, 
when the new artist has added a large amount of new material.170 
Although Danger Mouse exclusively used material from two copyrighted 
sources, his addition of one work to the other demonstrates a large amount 
of new (or at least foreign) material that was added to each original.  The 
Beatles’ music is altered by the addition of rap lyrics, while Jay-Z’s work is 
altered by the background of classic rock music.171  If courts are to accept 
mash-ups or other re-contextualized works, they may consider the amount 
of material that has been added to each copyrighted work, and whether the 
large additions are what provide the transformative change in tone and 
expression. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of postmodernism has brought surprising and sometimes 
shocking re-contextualized works of art to the forefront of today’s 
                                                          
 169. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 589 
(1994) (noting that in addition to taking elements of Orbison’s music, 2 Live Crew added 
scraper effects and new rap lyrics in such a way as to transform the original into a parody), 
with Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001) (noting that 
defendant’s work failed to be transformative since it was merely a literal depiction of the 
Three Stooges). 
 170. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (rejecting a fair use claim where defendants used large portions of copyrighted 
material for a trivia book and failed to add any significant expression, criticism, or 
commentary to the material they appropriated); Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. 
Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying defendant’s fair use claim where the failure 
to add criticism or commentary resulted in the new work amounting to mere plot summaries 
of Godzilla movies). 
 171. Commentators have noted Danger Mouse’s skill in manipulating the works to make 
them work together, as opposed to simply laying unaltered lyrics over unaltered music.  See, 
e.g., Armstrong, supra note 12, at 12 (quoting Stephen Webber, a music production 
professor, as saying that “‘[b]y limiting himself to two records, DJ Danger Mouse was 
challenging himself . . . [i]t requires skill’”); Gitlin, supra note 85 (arguing that the 
manipulations and interesting combinations ensure that The Grey Album is not simply a 
straightforward mash-up album). 
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culture.172  This new mode of expression has generally been met with 
approval by the public,173 yet has not been so favorably greeted by 
copyright owners.174  Postmodern artists often seek to use and combine 
currently existing materials in order to express their views, yet many of the 
rights holders to these original materials seem hesitant to license 
permission to (often unknown) artists who clearly intend to manipulate the 
meaning of the original work.  Even when rights holders are willing to 
license their works, the licensing fees often exceed what the new artist can 
afford.175 
Certain courts sympathetic to copyright holders no doubt would suggest 
a bright line rule,176 where new artists either have to license the existing 
material or else create something truly new instead of simply mashing up 
and capitalizing off of the success of other artists.  But all artists build on 
what comes before them.  In the words of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge Kozinski, “[n]othing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is 
genuinely new:  Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, 
each new creator building on the works of those who came before.  
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.”177  
Postmodernism, in a sense, is simply more honest about the appropriation 
involved.  Postmodernism reflects the view that there is nothing new to 
create, or that everything new already has been created.178  That is why 
postmodernism relies so heavily on pastiche, or bits and pieces of existing 
                                                          
 172. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811 (describing Warhol’s silkscreened 
paintings of Marilyn Monroe); Jackie Craven, Great Buildings:  AT&T Headquarters, 
http://architecture.about.com/library/bl-johnson-att.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (showing 
and describing the Philip Johnson Sony Building (formerly the AT&T Building) in New 
York City, a skyscraper adorned with a baroque pediment); MTV Ultimate Mash-ups, supra 
note 159 (featuring a live concert by Linkin Park and Jay-Z). 
 173. For example, over one million people have now downloaded The Grey Album.  See 
Danger Mouse, supra note 92 (“With one million downloads in just one week . . . the 
release of the Grey Album is considered a watershed moment in music history.). 
 174. For example, EMI has sent out cease and desist letters not only to Danger Mouse, 
but also to websites posting the music.  Dean, supra note 11; see, e.g., Capitol Records, 
supra note 85 (demanding that Downhillbattle.org refrain from distributing The Grey 
Album). 
 175. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting that refusal to license the works 
to a new artist can often sacrifice creativity in an effort to obtain profit). 
 176. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398-99 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (setting a bright line rule that the use of any sampled material, even if just a few 
notes, constitutes unfair infringement). 
 177. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting); see also Leval, supra note 4, at 1109 (“First, all intellectual creative activity 
is in part derivative.  There is no such thing as a wholly original thought or invention . . . .  
Second, important areas of intellectual activity are explicitly referential.  Philosophy, 
criticism, history, and even the natural science require continuous re-examination of 
yesterday’s theses.”). 
 178. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 280-82 n.37 (presenting Frederic Jameson’s view 
that the disintegration of modern forms and style has lead artists in a state where invention is 
not really possible). 
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material.179 
The postmodern assertion that there is nothing truly new is valuable 
social commentary in itself.  The reflection of this idea in re-contextualized 
works should therefore be allowed if copyright really does promote the 
sharing of new expressions with the public.  The expression of this social 
commentary, that everything new has already been created, could very well 
fit within the fair use defense’s current allowance of works that amount to 
commentary. Fair use should adapt to allow truly transformative re-
contextualized works of music and art since they are referential (i.e., the 
audience generally knows what works are involved),180 they are 
complementary to the originals,181 and they are transformative because they 
create a new expression via the juxtaposition of the different works.182  
Like parodies, postmodern works necessarily require the use of the 
copyrighted material that they seek to reference.183  Courts should therefore 
consider extending the protections afforded to parodies to re-contextualized 
works as well. 
This does not mean, however, that every mash-up album, or even every 
use of sampling, should qualify for protection.  Fair use seeks to allow only 
the truly transformative, that which adds “new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings.”184  As consistent with this policy, 
postmodern works succeed when they combine seemingly irreconcilable 
works into a new work that confounds traditional expectations.185  
Therefore, if fair use creates an enclave for re-contextualized works, it 
should not extend to works that simply amount to re-mixes, or other such 
works where an artist combines works of similar genres or styles, which 
result in little change from the tone or expression of the original work.186  
                                                          
 179. Id.  Szymanski then relates the concept of postmodern pastiche to digital music 
samples, and concludes that samples are in effect, “bits of pastiche.”  Id. 
 180. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (arguing that to be 
considered fair use, the original work must be the subject of the manipulation so as to fulfill 
the public recognition of the original work). 
 181. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 523 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
complementary products which feature new materials are more likely to be fair use than 
substitute products). 
 182. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1111 (suggesting that transformative works exhibit new 
insights). 
 183. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing how, by definition, mash-up 
songs and albums require the use of almost all the a cappella lyrics of one artist and a 
substantial amount of music from another artist). 
 184. Leval, supra note 4, at 1111. 
 185. See Szymanski, supra note 7, at 283 (explaining how the postmodern artist 
constructs one text with the underlying music, but then adds samples of different “cultural 
temperatures” on top of it, which has the effect of “puncturing one sign system in the name 
of another”). 
 186. This limitation would follow Justice Kennedy’s admonition in Acuff-Rose that the 
defense should not be flexible enough to apply to all new versions of old songs.  See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 599 (Kennedy, J., 
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The combination of works that span genres and generations, however, 
should be more likely to gain protection.  Danger Mouse’s mixture of 
1960s pop legends The Beatles, with modern day rap artist Jay-Z, would 
present a plausible argument for fair use. 
The dominance of the Jay-Z lyrics over background music in both Jay-
Z’s The Black Album and Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album, however, 
demonstrates that there could be far more transformative works than The 
Grey Album.187  Works where an artist transforms all source material 
extensively, and where the result is a truly new expression, would be even 
more likely to gain protection.  Thus, an aspiring artist could build 
background music and beats with music taken exclusively from one genre 
(as Danger Mouse did with The Beatles’ music), and then take and alter the 
lyrics from a seemingly different genre (whereas Danger Mouse took, but 
did not really alter, Jay-Z’s lyrics)188 and mix them together in such a way 
that the result no longer seems to fit either genre.189  The possibility of 
creating a re-contextualized work could easily move beyond the realm of 
the mash-up or even music.  By taking an element of a familiar work, be it 
music, art, literature, or something else, and combining it with something 
seemingly irreconcilable to create a new vision, an artist may create an 
interesting postmodern work that toys with conventional meanings and 
expressions.190 
The increasing popularity of the mash-up movement may well spur the 
market to correct the problem of high licensing fees or outright refusals to 
                                                          
concurring) (stating that “[a]lmost any revamped modern version of a familiar composition 
can be construed as a ‘comment on the naiveté of the original’ because of the difference in 
style and because it will be amusing to hear how the old tune sounds in a new genre”). 
 187. For example, a pair of reviewers noted how Danger Mouse’s success stemmed from 
his ability to twist The Beatles’ music to fit the same mood as the Jay-Z lyrics.  Reid & 
Patel, supra note 82.  In addition, reviewers consistently labeled the work a hip-hop album.  
See, e.g., Gitlin, supra note 85 (calling The Grey Album “an ingenious hip-hop record”); 
Graham, supra note 82 (referring to The Grey Album as “the most intriguing hip-hop album 
in recent memory”).  Considering that one of Danger Mouse’s sources, Jay-Z, is a hip-hop 
artist, it seems as if future artists could create more transformative works by combining two 
different genres of music in such a way that the result differs from both in terms of style. 
 188. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (explaining how Danger Mouse chopped 
up, edited, and otherwise altered The Beatles’ music to produce the background for The 
Grey Album, while he essentially just used Jay-Z’s a cappella lyrics). 
 189. By contrast, although Danger Mouse altered both The Beatles’ music and Jay-Z’s 
lyrics by his skillful combination of the two, the album still sounds like hip hop, the same 
genre as Jay-Z’s The Black Album.  See supra note 187 and accompanying text (presenting 
the views of various commentators that Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album sounds or feels 
like a hip hop album). 
 190. See, e.g., Transcript, Virtual Reality, Appropriation, and Property Rights in Art:  A 
Roundtable Discussion, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 101-02 (1994) (listing a number 
of examples of instances of commercial appropriation in art, including works by Jasper 
Johns, Rauschenberg, and Andy Warhol); id. at 102 (suggesting that new advancements in 
photography which allow artists to combine different images may also lead to the creation 
of new types of expression). 
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license samples for use in new works.191  However, a fair use enclave for 
truly transformative re-contextualized works should nevertheless protect 
those ambitious new artists who aim to use existing materials in ways that 
no one else would imagine.  To allow such uses would re-affirm the 
copyright’s goal of ensuring public enrichment through access to new 
expression.  After all, “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the 
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”192  To 
deny re-contextualized works from consideration under fair use as 
transformative works may well be to deny significant amounts of 
postmodern expression from ever reaching the public193—and that hardly 
seems to promote the arts. 
                                                          
 191. Alternately, the increasing popularity of sample-based music may lead to legislative 
changes calling for compulsory licensing schemes.  See generally Achenbach, supra note 16 
(arguing that the growing conflict between artists who want to use samples and the owners 
of those rights who routinely refuse the use of those samples calls for amendment of the 
Copyright Act to institute compulsory licensing for digital music samples). 
 192. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Acuff-Rose), 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 193. See Leval, supra note 4, at 1109 (“Monopoly protection of intellectual property that 
impeded referential analysis and the development of new ideas out of old would strangle the 
creative process.”). 
